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INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
R.R. Baxter
International law suffers both from
its friends and its enemies. Its enemies
include the geopoliticians, who hear
nothing but the surge and crash of great
international forces; the Kennanites,
who rebel against a "legalistic" approach to international affairs; and the
specialists in international relations,
who, not knowing very much about the
subject, lump international law, as conceived by Hugo Grotius, with the
League of Nations, the United Nations,
and the control of the white slave trade.
The similarity between some of the
friends of international law and most of
its enemies is that they overstate the
pretended case for international law. It
is then all too ea'sy to demonstrate that,
despite the claims made for international law, the world is still in a deplorable state. The truth lies somewhere
between the contentions of those who
find no place for international law in
the savage world of interstate relations
and those who believe that the millenium can be achieved with a heavy
infusion of international law and good
will. What is the correct view must be
left to each of you to determine at the
end of this brief introductory course.

It is quite clear that man has not
been able to legislate war and aggression
into defeat or even into retreat, although the institutions which the international community has developed exercise some restraints on the use of force.
Customary law cannot cope adequately
with the need for peaceful change. If a
nation needs more territory or larger
markets, the law cannot provide them.
It cannot make an unhappy people
happy; it cannot turn arid desert into a
flowering paradise; it cannot bring international tranquility and understanding
where discord reigned before. Indeed, it
might be safe to say that international
law has been most successful in dealing
with minor matters and with the slighter
causes of in terna tional friction.
Probably it shows a greater facility in
preserving the status quo than in doing
justice.
Within these severe limitations, international law does play an important
part in minimizing possible sources of
international friction and in making it
possible for nations and their people to
live together peacefully in an increasingly crowded world. This is not to say
that it is the only force making for these
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conditions. Merchants do not perform
their contracts only because the law
grants a remedy against them if they do
not The Uniform Code of Military
Justice and the law of the State of
Rhode Island are not the only restraints
which keep you from resorting to physical violence against those you dislike or
with whom you disagree. So also in the
international sphere, enlightened selfin terest, certain consideration of
morality, the desire for stability, and
the fear of retaliation work with the
precepts of international law to maintain international order. Actually, it is
impossible to separate international law
from these other forces, for the law
which governs the relationships of
States has its origins in self-interest,
morality, the quest for stability, and the
fear of the consequences of conduct
departing from international standards.
International law-or the law of nations, as it is sometimes called-performs two major services. The first of
these is to insure stability. The second is
the creation of arrangements for future
avoidance of conflict and dispute.
I must speak first of the law's function in the preservation of stable international relationships, for this is the
principal concern of the customary law
which has grown up over the course of
the centuries. One of the greatest legal
thinkers of our age, Hans Kelsen, who
served for a year as Professor of International Law here at the War College, has
written a book on the "General Theory
of Law and State." He speaks in page
after page of a "basic norm" upon
which all international law and all national legal systems depend. One waits
anxiously for this key to the legal
universe as one reads through several
hundred pages of profound and not
altogether easy prose. Finally, on page
369, one ,finds the basic principle upon
which all else depends-"The States
ought to behave as they have customarily behaved." At first reading this
statement sounds didactic, unhelpful,

perhaps even foolish. It is certainly
anticlimatic. But a little thought will, I
think, persuade you that this is a useful
key to international law. But why, in a
dynamic universe, should we behave as
we have in the past? We do so because if
we allow our conduct to fall into certain
patterns, we avoid some of the clashes
between States which would arise if
each point of contact presented a fresh
issue to be fought out. If persons having
to pass through a farmer's field keep to
the path and if the farmer refrains from
planting his crops in that path, there
will be scant possibility of any dispute
between pedestrians and the farmer. If
people constantly take different paths
across the field and the farmer blocks
off various paths, bad feelings and even
violence can be anticipated. Other reasons as well dictate that we should act
within the legal limits which have grown
up through force of custom in the past.
If we react differently in different instances of the same ·factual situation,
our conduct becomes inconsistent and
irrational. Plain laziness may be another
reason why we should continue to act as
we have acted before. If a contlict of
interests in the past was solved only
with much pain and difficulty, there is
no reason why the battle should be
refought each time the identical contlict
of interest arises.
This psychological explanation of
why we find it expedient to conform to
the pattern of rights and duties previously established leaves unanswered the
question how these rights and duties
arose in the first place. Some of them
are based on principles of justice not
unlike those underlying the laws of
various countries. The responsibility a
State has for the injury which one of its
employees intlicts on an alien, for example by taking his property without
compensation, is a reflection of what
most systems of law have considered to
be just dealing over the course of the
years. In other instances, the role of
justice is somewhat less clear. There is
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no great principle of right dealing which
calls for a territorial sea of three miles
instead of two or four. Historically, the
limit was more or less arbitrarily established and was not even, as many people
think it was, equivalent to the range of
cannon in the eighteenth century. An
international boundary is not, except in
terms of politics, "just" or "unjust"; it
simply is. The respect which the law
demands for the distinction between
what is mine and what is thine, however, can be said to reflect just dealing.
A third area of international law is the
result of the adoption of policies for the
regulation of international intercourse.
Of this nature are the immunities enjoyed by diplomats and consuls. Justice
might demand that if an ambassador
were introducing narcotics into the
Statc to which he was accredited in
violation of its law, he should be prosecu ted in the courts of that State. But it
is considered that the conduct of international relations wiII be facilitated by
giving the ambassador complete freedom from suit. Any other rule might
make it difficult for him to carry out his
represcntative functions.
I spoke several minutes ago of the
second role of international law as being
the framing of institutions and arrangements which wiII permit nations, in
their relations with other States, with
international organizations, and with
aliens, to avoid conflict and to create
the conditions under which political and
social and economic security can be
achieved. It might be more correct to
speak of this as a role of the international lawyer, for this is essentially a
creative function. Those charged with
the making of a new law must also
know what principles, rules, organizational forms and controls have worked
in the past, for, as Santayana has reminded us, those who forget the past
are condemned to relive it. This is no
more than to say that the lawyer or
layman who is drafting a treaty should
have a grounding in customary intern a-

tional law. Amongst the problems with
which we wiII deal in seminars during
the next ten days, you will recognize
some problems which ask you to declar~
what the proper result would be under
the existing law and others in which you
are asked to think creatively about what
should be the future of the law.
In what I have to say about the
origins and purposes of international
law, I do not mean to underestimate the
importance of international politics-of
power politics. Statesmen and lawyers
from the Latin American States not
infrequently complain that the principles of responsibility for injuries to the
persons and property of aliens which
can be derived from the numerous cases
decided by arbitral tribunals reflect the
fact that marines and gunboats made it
possible for the United States to force
arbitration of these cases on terms
favorable to the United States. The
most recent example we have had of the
way in which politics molds international law was in the Geneva Conference
on the Law of the Sea. As to each
proposal made at the Conference, the
question of each State was: How will
this affect my political and economic
interests? Saudi Arabia and Israel were
worried about how the provisions on
bays and on passage through straits
would affect Aqaba and the Straits of
Tiran. The CEP Powers-Chile, Ecuador,
and Peru-were concerned with the
maintenance of a 200-mile territorial
sea. Iceland wondered how the fishing
grounds of its coast would be affected.
Panama wished to protect its position as
a refuge for shipping seeking a mir.imum
of regulation. Failure to agree on the
breadth of the territorial sea, admittedly
a most important matter, should not
obscure the fact that, in spite of these
political differences, some sound conventions were hammered out. As you
read these, I think you will be persuaded that they represent a sound and
just balancing of interests and that
they should and wiII be adopted by
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a substantial number of States.
blockade and the need of the neutrals to
A healthy political realism is usemaintain their trade. The important
ful. It should not lead you to cynichanges wrought in the law relating to
cism. States do conform to internacontraband and blockade as the result
tional law even though abiding by the
of two World Wars will be considered in
law in a particular case may cost them
some detail in connection with the
money or be adverse to their interests.
seminar problems on the economic
The record of compliance with the
blockade, which are designed to draw
judgments of international tribunals is
attention to the new developments in
excellent. States do pay international
this field. Over and above these two
claims arising out of violations of interfunctions of regulating the conduct of
national law committed by their
the belligerents toward the victims of
officials, members of their armed forces,
war and neutral nations and their trade,
and their employees. The United States,
the law of war, in dealing with such
for example, has paid for the foreign
subjects as armistices and surrenders and
vessels which it requisitioned, consisnegotiations between belligerents, protently with international law, during the
vides procedures for bringing hostilities
Second World War. Egypt has paid full
to a close short of total annihilation of
compensation for the nationalization of
one or both of the contending parties. I
the Suez Canal, as international law
assume that those of you who may have
probably required it to do. Each time
some mental reservations about a battle
that a State acts in accordance with
fought between two scorpions in a
international law, it makes it easier for
bottle may not be unsympathetic to
these purposes of the law of war. The
that State to demand conformity with
international law by other States.
law of war has been violated often, but,
The durability of law is attested by
every instance in which it has been
the fact that it survives even in time of
observed, it has brought about a mitigawar, when the belligerents have cast off
tion of violence, often measurable in
those restraints which normally keep
terms of human lives saved, and this
them at peace. There is virtually no law
without prejudice to the efficient congoverning the conduct of hostilities
duct of war.
themselves, but as we move further
To many, lawyers and nonlawyers
from the scene of battle and conditions
alike, it seems incredible that a body of
become somewhat more stabilized the
rules purporting to govern the conduct
law increasingly becomes able to perof nations but providing no sanctions or
form its humanitarian mission of pro- - punishment for their violation should be
tecting the victims of war from unnecescalled law at all. It is not altogether fair
sary devastation and suffering. Even the
to speak of international law as a
total war of today does not require the
sanctionless body of law, for the great
extermination of the part of the civilian
numbers of cases in which damages have
population that does not take part in
been awarded and paid and in which
hostilities; the wounded and sick, and
individuals have been punished for
prisoners of war, the protection of
criminal violations of the law of nations
whom is not only compatible with the
bear witness to the contrary. The single
efficient conduct of hostilities but also
category of cases in which civil damages
is conducive to victory in the political
most commonly have been granted are
struggle of which the use of force is
those arising out of wrongs done by
only one aspect. A large part of the law
States to aliens. Criminal penalties, leavof the sea is devoted to striking a
ing aside such exceptional offenses as
piracy, have been reserved for violations
balance between the demand of the
of the law of war, which resemble the
belligerents to carry on their economic
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normal crimes punishable under national legal systems to such a degree
that some countries even have tried war
criminals under their ordinary penal
codes. Yet a third type of satisfaction
exists in international law-the apology
or rendering of honors or other admission of violation of the law. One should
not scoff at these symbolic acts. They
constitute outward and visible signs of
what should be the correct relationships
between the parties and the proper
principle of law to be applied in the
future.
But, you justifiably object, what
force is there to compel a State to pay
the damages which have been assessed
against it, or to render up its nationals
for trial by a foreign court, or to admit
the impropriety or illegality of its conduct in a particular case? Admittedly,
there is no international sheriff armed
with power to see that judgments are
enforced or that the parties appear
before an international tribunal in the
first place. But it is easy to overemphasize the importance of the sanction. A
superior court has no forceful means at
its disposal to compel obedience to its
mandate by a subordinate court. If a
court directs a command to the executive which goes unheeded, what means
has it of compelling that obedience?
You may remember the words attributed to President Jackson: "Well, John
Marshall has made his decision, now let
him enforce it!" A comparative statistical analysis of the number of divisions
available to the Pope and to the United
States Supreme Court would not be
difficult to make. And if a hillbilly
called to high political office voices
contempt for the law of the land and
allows the mob to rule within his
jurisdiction, can the sanction of employing loyal troops solve this prohlem of
subversion? Sanctions, as we commonly
think of them, seem to belong to the
normal day-to-day enforcement of the
law. The great edifice of our constitutional system is held together not by the

fear of duress if the law he violated, but
by a common devotion and loyalty to
the law by those charged with its
making and its application.
Moreover, as I mentioned some
minutes ago, it is not the law alone, in
the form of a fear of crimil1al penalty or
of civil damages, which secures compliance with law. Morality, taboos, social
pressure, the views of -the community,
and religion are among the forces allied
with the threat of penalty or damages in
securing compliance with law.
It thus would appear that the sanction behind the sanction in national law
is the sense of the community that it
should be governed by the rule of law.
It is that basic sanction which is lacking
very largely in the international sphere.
It is not absent altogether, however, for,
if it were, the world would,be in a state
of anarchy. The extent of the conviction in favor of subjection to law varies
from country to country, from international relationship to international relationship, from legal principle to legal
principle, and from case to case. With
many countries of the world, the United
States has a vast network of agreements,
which are carried out on a routine basis,
although differences of views as to
interpretation may arise from time to
time. The United States can carry on
discussions with Great Britain or France
or Switzerland or Japan in terms of
international law, and both parties can
make themselves understood. We-and I
speak here of a responsibility all
Americans bear through our senatorsare, on the other hand, unwilling to
concede to the International Court of
Justice compulsory jurisdiction over disputes with those States with which we
have the closest affinities of law, tradition, interest, and security. In their
public pronouncements, our principal
ministers are dedicated fiercely to the
rule of law and in steadfast opposition
to international sin. In its actual conduct in particular cases, this country
frequently shows itself as zealous to
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preserve its sovereignty-which is a
polite way of saying being a law unto
itself-as other major powers.
In the present state of international
law, it is not surprising that the law
should not be interpreted uniformly,
even in theoretical terms, throughout
the world. Legal rules sometimes exist
on a regional basis. A clear example is
the principle regarding political asylum
in embassies which prevails in Latin
America but only to a very limited
extent elsewhere. More obvious to the
eye is the peculiar nature of Soviet
international law. This cannot be explained solely in terms of Marxist
theory. The Soviet view of international
law is without doubt a servant of the
policy of the U.S.S.R., and, as such, it
serves a most important defensive function. If you were to compare the international law of modern Russia with that
which prevailed in the rest of the world
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, I think you would be
struck by the similarity. Soviet international law is strongly isolationist and
places great emphasis on State sovereignty; that is, on freedom from interference by other States. This shield
against legal controls permits the
U.S.S.R. to carry out its policies
through internal subversion and through
political pressures, while international
law is used to ward off legal attacks on
the U.S.S.R. and the nation within
which the subversion is being practiced.
There are other aspects of Russia's
attitude toward international law which
stem from the history of Russia and
would remain unchanged if the U.S.S.R.
were to join the Free World tomorrow.
For example, one of the cardinal principles of Soviet foreign policy has always
been to maintain the Black Sea as a
private swimming club, with outsiders
barred at the Turkish Straits. If the
Russians are difficult about this point, it
is not the corrupting influence of Communism which has made them so.
This is not the time nor am I the

person to speculate about the way in
which the world may be made subject
to the rule of law. Some suggest that the
creation of a true world law, binding on
all States and enforced against them,
must await the creation of a world
government. An important blueprint for
the centralization of some governmental
functions on the international plane has
recently been made in a study by Mr.
Grenville Clark and Professor Louis
Sohn. There are others who maintain
that in the past law has been necessary
before the State or a government could
be created. According to this view, we
must promote the observance of law
between States before we can hope to
see any form of international government. Perhaps the correct view is that
government and law, inextricably related as they are, must march together.
Having spoken of the origin and
force of international law, I now must
turn to some description of international law as it exists today, with
particular emphasis upon the sources of
international law. There is some criticism, I might add, of the term "international law" itself, for it is complained
that the body of law with which we
must concern ourselves in these days is a
larger one "which regulates actions or
events which transcend national frontiers." Professor Jessup, whose description this is, and a number of other
authorities prefer to employ the term
"transnational law." Historically, international law has been said to be that
body of law which governs the relationships of States. Nevertheless, the impact
of the law of nations always has been
felt by individuals. If Nation A owes
Nation B a duty to protect the latter's
citizens when they are in the territory
of State A, the duty may be owed to
Nation B, but it is the national of State
B who is protected or injured, as the
case may be. If one State owes another
nation a duty not to subject the soldiers
of the latter to the jurisdiction of its
courts for line-of-duty offenses in time
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of war, it is the individual soldier or
sailor who ultimately benefits from that
immunity. But the International Court
of Justice as well as many international
lawyers continue to pay lip service to
the old view when they say that a State
bringing a claim against another for an
injury to its national does so because of
an injury to its intere~ts, not because of
the injury to the alien. In our day, when
international relationships have grown
more complex and States have to deal
with other nations, with foreign corporations, with alien individuals, with
public international organizations, with
privatc international organizations (like
thc Intcrnational Committee of the Red
Cross or the International Air Transport
Association), it is probably more correct
to say that international law governs the
relationship of a State or public international organization with some person or
body of persons or entity foreign to it.
The law in this area is still in the process
of formation. Only a few years ago, the
International Court of Justice was able
to conclude that the United Nations had
international standing to present a claim
arising out of the death of Count
Bernadotte, the United Nations Mediator in Palestine. The Court noted that
the organization was endowed sufficiently with the characteristics of
international personality that it had
been able to conclude agreements on
thc international plane in the past.
The sources of international law are
described conveniently for us in Article
38 of the Statutes of the International
Court of Justice, which deals with the
law to be applied by that tribunal. I will
have a few words to say about each of
tllese and some related observations
about where to find the law. The first of
tllese sources of law is "international
conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states," by
which is meant treaties to which the
litigating States are parties. Treaties may
be bilateral, binding on two States, or

multilateral, if three or more States are
parties. The term "international legislation" is sometimes used to describe "the
process and the product of the conscious effort to make addition to, or
changes in, the law of nations," the
definition being that of Judge Hudson,
who has edited a notable collection of
such treaties. International legislation,
as thus conceived, must be distinguished
from the laws adopted by national
legislatures. It is of the essence of
national legislation, whether enacted by
a direct vote, as in a town meeting, or
through representatives of the people,
that a properly enacted statute or resolution or ordinance should bind even
those who were opposed to its adoption. The situation is quite different
with respect to treaties, for, with rare
exceptions, they bind only those who
have consented to become parties to the
agreement. In this respect, they are
more like contracts than like statutes. I
said "with exceptions" because some
provisions of the United Nations Charter, to take one example, purport to
govern the conduct of nonmembers of
the organization. In other instances,
conventions-a term often applied to
multilateral treaties-have been drawn
up which declare that they are declaratory of customary international law so
that we may look to them as evidence
of the customary law binding on nonparties to the conventions. A number of
the defendants in the German war
crimes trials maintained that since the
Regulations annexed to Convention No.
IV of The Hague of 1907 were not in
force betwcen the parties to the conflict, the criminality of their conduct
could not be adjudged in terms of those
Regulations. To this contention, the
tribunals replied that the Hague Regulations and certain provisions of the
Geneva Prisoners of War Convention of
1929 as well were declaratory of customary international law and it therefore was possible to look to them as the
best statement of customary law.
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In order to determine the meaning of a
provision of a treaty, it is often necessary
to have reference to the drafting history
or travaux preparatoires of the agreement In the case of a multilateral convention, this will include the debates in
the conference which drafted the treaty,
the proceedings of the various commissions of the conference, and the reports
prepared by the commissions and the
conference. The International Court of
Justice has shown itself reluctant to rely
on the drafting history of an agreement in
order to ascertain its meaning, but it has
turned to the travaux prepara to ires in
order to support the conclusion it already
has reached.
The second source of international
law mentioned in Article 38 of the
Statute of the Court is "international
custom, as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law." The evidence of international custom is to be sought primarily
in S tate practice. It has often been said in
the past that the conduct of a State
cannot be creative of law genuinely
unless it be undertaken because the State
believed this course of action was the
proper or obligatory one. I think that it is
safer to say that State practice, without
regard to its motives or intent, creates
customary law, provided it be acquiesced
in by other nations and is not regarded as
improper. It is in order to prevent the
hardening of a country's claims into law
that other States make protests, as, for
example, against the claim to a territorial
sea of 200 miles or to the sudden closing
of a bay on the asserted grounds that it is
a historic bay constituting national
waters of the claimant The claim of
Norway to a territorial sea of four miles
drawn from straight base lines wasrecognized by the International Court of
Justice because of the fact that Norway
long had asserted its right to those waters
and other States had acquiesced in this
claim. It is this translation of practice
into customary law to which I referred
earlier when I spoke of the law's search
for stability through adherence to a

pattern of conduct established in the
past.
We search for evidence of international custom in diplomatic history, in
collections of diplomatic documents,
and in the writings of scholars who have
written on these matters. In the case of
the United States, the great source
record of our diplomatic history is the
series Foreign Relations of the United
States, in which the important diplomatic correspondence of this country is
printed. Publication of this record follows about fifteen years after the events
recorded. The practice of the United
States and of many other countries is
found more conveniently in Hackworth's Digest of International Law, the
eight volumes of which are one of the
most important sources for anyone interested in international law.
The third source mentioned is "the
general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations." This provision makes
national legal systems a source of law
for the creation of international law,
especially in those cases where there are
as yet no applicable principles of the
law of nations. Unjust enrichment and
respect for acquired rights have been
said to be two of the principles carried
over from municipal law-as international lawyers confusingly call national
law-into the law of nations.
The fourth subparagraph of Article
38 of the Charter lists two final sources.
The first of these is "judicial decisions."
The most important of these are the
judgments of the Permanent Court of
International Justice, renamed the International Court of Justice at the time of
the adoption of the Charter just to show
people that the Court had never had
anything to do with the League. These
are printed in collections of judgments
of the Court. The decisions of arbitral
tribunals also constitute "judicial decisions" for this purpose. The word
"arbitral" as applied to these courts is
somewhat misleading, since they render
their decisions on the basis of law and
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not as an attempted compromise of
the conflicting demands of the parties
to the arbitration. There are many
individual volumes reporting the decisions of various arbitral tribunals. The
most useful general collection is that
published by the United Nations, Reports of International Arbitral Awards.
The opinions of national courts on
questions of international law also are
entitled to considerable weight, even
though in some instances these tribunals
may be expected to take a somewhat
more partisan view of the law than
would an international tribunal. An
annual volume, bearing the title of the
International Law Reports, collects
these decisions of national courts.
The second of the two "subsidiary
means for the determination of rules of
law" listed in subparagraph l( d) of
Article 38 is "the teachings of the most
highly qualified publicists of the various
nations," or, more simply, scholarly
writings. So vast is the amount of treaty
law, State practice, and judicial decisions that we must rely upon learned
writers to synthesize this material and
reduce it to manageable proportions.
The scholar of the law also fills the
valuable functions of criticizing the law,
of attempting to clarify its ambiguities,
of suggesting the filling of gaps, and of
charting the progress of the law for the
future. In this country, the leading text
is that of the late Charles Cheney Hyde,
International Law, Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United
States. In Great Britain and throughout
the Commonwealth, international
lawyers took to the two volumes of
Oppenheim, periodically rewritten and
supplemented by Judge Lauterpacht.
This rapid survey of the origin and
application of international law would
not be complete without some reference
to the effect given customary international law and treaties in the law of the
United States. I think that it is probably
safe to say that international law and
treaties enter into the decision of

hundreds of cases in our courts every
year. International law is part of the law
of this country and is applied routinely
in our State and Federal courts. Treaties
are, under the Constitution, part of the
"supreme Law of the Land" on an equal
footing with the Constitution and the
laws of the United States. It is a
consequence of the fact that statutes
and treaties are on the same level that a
treaty prevails over a prior inconsistent
treaty, without, of course, impairing the
binding force of the treaty internationally. In this latter event, the Congress makes implementation of the
treaty impossible and thereby causes a
violation of the treaty by the United
States.
If the courts of the United States
find it easy to give internal effect to
international law, the position of the
Executive Branch of our government
and the Congress as regards the function
of law in the conduct of foreign affairs
is in marked contrast. The crucial test of
the sincerity of a State's devotion to the
rule of law is whether that State is
willing to submit its international disputes to the compulsory jurisdiction of
the International Court of Justice in the
Hague. The Statute of the Court provides that individual cases may be referred specially to the Court or that
States may recognize the jurisdiction of
the Court as compulsory. in all legal
disputes concerning the interpretation
of a treaty; any question of international law; the existence of any fact
which, if established, would constitute a
breach of an international obligation;
and the reparation to be made. The
United States has accepted the jurisdiction of the Court, but with several
limitations, the most important of
which excepts matters within the
domestic jurisdiction of the United
States, as determined by the United
States. If this country does not wish a
particular case to go to the Court it only
has to say that the case is one within its
domestic jurisdiction. It would not be
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unfair to construe this statement as
meaning that the United States accepts
the jurisdiction of the Court except as
to those cases in which it does not wish
to accept the jurisdiction of the Court.
A notable example of the unwillingness
of the United States to submit its
disputes to judicial settlement is the
Interhandel case. The fundamental substantive issue in that case is whether
certain property seized by the United
States during World War II is German,
and thus enemy property, or Swjss
property. The Swiss Government maintains that the property in question is
actually Swiss, and that the United
States is obliged to_ submit the matter to
arbitration under our treaties with that
country. Here are two countries with
similar economic systems, with like devotion to the rule of law, with similar
democratic institutions. There is no
pitting of the Free World against the
Communist World here, no great political issue, but solely a lawyer's question
of whether there is an obligation to
arbitrate and whether the property in
issue belongs to Swiss or German nationals. It is hard to conceive of a case
more narrowly legal in nature. And yet
the United States seems to be unwilling
to submit even the issue of our obligation to arbitrate to judicial settlement.
Our fulminations about the refusal of
the U.S.S.R. to accept the jurisdiction
of the Court as to a number of claims
arising out of destruction of our military aircraft seem ludicrous in light of
our own record as a possible defendant
before the International Court of Justice.
Despite such lapses, I suppose that

one of the values which we are attempting to defend against the absolutist world is the rule of law in the
international sphere as well as in our
various national ones. Our quest for
legality and order inevitably will suffer
if we forget how to apply law in our
relations with our friends, and perhaps
in our relations with those with whom
we are less friendly as well. Quite aside
from this moral commitment which we
have made, the restraints which international law place on our own conduct are
in our best interests. International relations are made easier by a system which
has mapped out where one State's jurisdiction ends and another State's begins.
In the explosive atmosphere of our
contemporary world, a spark in the
wrong place and at the wrong time
could spell disaster. The person who
acts inconsistently with law thus may
do a tremendous disservice to his own
cause and to' his own country. This
seems to me to be one of the most
important single reasons why naval officers must acquaint themselvcs with the
body of law which governs the foreign
relations of their country. The study
which you will make of international
law during the coming days should help
you to identify the danger areas, to
distinguish the real restraints of the law
from those which exist only in theory,
and to understand a problem put in
legal terms. It is the hope of all of us
who have come here to share our
knowledge of international law with
you that you will come to recognize in
the law of nations a shield and a sword
in the battle we wage for an orderly and
peaceful world.
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